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"'Fidelity' to the commands of the Constitution suggests
balanced judgment rather than exhortation. The highest
"fidelity" is not achieved by the judge who instinctively goes
furthest in upholding even the most bizarre claim of
individual constitutional rights, any more than it is
achieved by a judge who goes furthest in accepting the most
restrictive claims of governmental authorities. The task of
this Court, as of other courts, is to 'hold the balance true.'" 1
I.

THE NIGHTMARE

Imagine that you are a law student driving home to see your
spouse and children after a hard day at school. As you drive
down Oak Street towards your home, you see and wave to a
police officer, glad that he is patrolling your street because of the
frequency of people driving over forty-five mph on your twentyfive mph street. Shortly thereafter, you see his blue light behind
you pulling you over. You pull over and engage in the following
conversation:
You: I'm glad you're here. We've had a real problem with
speeders in the neighborhood. But why did you stop me?
Police officer: You were going twenty-nine mph in a twenty-five
mph zone.
You: The problem has been drivers driving over forty-five mph.
That's why we asked you to step up neighborhood patrol. You
aren't going to ticket me for going four miles over the speed
limit, are you?
Police officer: Oh no, nothing like that, but I would like to
search your car.
You: Sorry, I've got too many private items in my car. I can't
let you do that.
Police officer: Sorry you feel that way. In that case, I'm going to
have to arrest you.
You: Now why would you want to do a thing like that?!
Police officer: Because I can search your car incident to the
arrest. Then I can have it towed to the impound lot where
pursuant to our normal procedures, your car, including its

1 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983).

2002]

COP, CARS, AND CITIZENS

trunk can be inventoried. 2 And, of course, I'll have to handcuff
you to take you to the police station where you'll be held in a
cell and fingerprinted before you are released. Then maybe the
next time I ask to search your car, you won't be so
uncooperative.
The police officer then carries out his threat, leaving your
private items haphazardly thrown in a plastic garbage bag. As
you leave the jail, the police officer hands you the bag, and the
dialogue continues:
Police officer: Real sorry that I messed up your article on
abusive police practices. Were you writing that for the law
review?
You: As a matter of fact, I was.
Police officer: And that magazine on cross-dressing sure was
interesting. Do your friends know that you're into that?
You (exasperated): I'm not into that! I have a cousin in
Nebraska that's into that, and I got the magazine so I could
understand it better.
Police officer: Sure, that's what they all say.
You: OK buster, that does it! I'm filing suit against you
tomorrow.
Police officer: Don't bother.
constitutional.

Everything I did is perfectly

Just then you wake up and exclaim: "Thank God I live in
America and this can't happen." You then breathe a sigh of
relief, drink your morning coffee, and start reading your
assignment for Criminal Procedure: Atwater v. City of Lago
As you finish your
Vista 3 and Arkansas v. Sullivan.4
assignment, you slam down the casebook in disgust and
exclaim: "My God! The nightmare is real."

II. HOW THE BALANCE GOT BROKEN
Much of the
The balance has not always been askew.
Supreme Court's jurisprudence reflects a careful effort to balance
the factors that make automobile searches different from other
kinds of searches. While one might not always agree with the

2

See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); discussion infra Part II.B.
see discussion infra Part III.B.

3 532 U.S. 318 (2001);

4 532 U.S. 769 (2001); see discussion infra Part III.C.
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Court's balance, the effort to balance was almost always there.
From a police perspective, the balance was constantly improving.
Occasional backward steps were generally countered by two
positive ones. Of course, from a libertarian perspective, the
balance was moving in the other direction. Yet just months
before the coup de grace that made the nightmare a reality, the
Court invalidated an automobile checkpoint scheme designed to
5
interdict drugs.
I will now examine the various lines of cases that have
brought us to the current unacceptable state of the law.
A. Automobiles and Warrants
The first major Supreme Court case upholding warrantless
searches of automobiles was Carroll v. United States.6 Relying
on common sense and history, the Court held that the
Constitution permits a police officer to stop and search a vehicle
moving on the highway if, and only if, the officer has probable
cause to believe that the car contains contraband or other
material that the officer has the right to seize. 7 The Court
emphasized both the impracticality of obtaining a warrant before
the moving vehicle left the jurisdiction and the unreasonableness
8
of allowing the police to search any vehicle on the officer's whim.
Thus, the Court held the balance true by insisting on probable
cause, but not insisting on a warrant.
In 1970, forty-five years after Carroll, the Court added a
police-favoring wrinkle to the calculus. Chambers v. Maroney,9
like Carroll, involved the stoppage of an automobile on the
highway with probable cause and without a warrant. Unlike
Carroll, the police did not search the car on the spot. Instead,
they arrested Chambers and the other occupants of the car,
brought them and the car to the police station, and subsequently
searched the car without a warrant. 10

5 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000) ("Because the
primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover

evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth
Amendment."); discussion infra Part II.C.
6 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
7 See id. at 155-56.
8 See id. at 153-54.
9 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
10 Id. at 44.
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Although eschewing the principle that a car for which there
is probable cause to search may always be searched without a
warrant," the Court held, unsurprisingly, that the police could
have searched the car when and where it was stopped. 12 More
surprisingly, the Court added: "The probable-cause factor still
obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car
unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of
the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is
secured."'13 Precisely to whom the Court thought it was denying
automotive access is not at all clear. Certainly it was not
Chambers or his cohorts, who were residing in jail courtesy of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Although it would not have been difficult for the police to
obtain a warrant, the Court upheld the search without a warrant
on a rationale so transparently flimsy, that it is hard to take
seriously. Perhaps the Court's real rationale was divulged in a
footnote that suggested that both the safety of the officers and
the car would be better served by a search in the secure confines
of the police station, rather than the potentially hazardous dark
parking lot where the defendants were arrested.' 4 Left unsaid is
that a decision requiring a warrant would possibly encourage
future police to attempt the hazardous warrantless search,
rather than the safer search that required the inconvenience of a
warrant. So while Chamberstips the balance towards police and
away from citizens for no good articulated reason, the Court may
have had a plausible unarticulated justification for its decision.
Just a year later, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,15 the
Court 16 held that an automobile, seized contemporaneously with
the arrest of a suspect, could be neither seized nor subsequently
searched, in the absence of a warrant. Emphasizing the nonmobile character of the automobile, the Court noted that
Coolidge had been arrested, his wife had been removed from
their home, and two police officers stood guarding the home and
the driveway, where the car was parked. Concluding that "[tlhe
word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
11 See id. at 50.
12 See id. at 51 (requiring only a simple citation to Carroll).
13 Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
14 See id. at n.10.
15 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
16 Technically a plurality, Justice Harlan cast the decisive fifth vote in favor of
the plurality's result. See id. at 491 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Amendment fades away and disappears," 1 7 the Court refused to
be beguiled by the theoretical mobility of the car. Furthermore,
since the original seizure was unlawful, the subsequent search at
the police station would not be sustainable under Chambers.
The key question following Chambers and Coolidge was
ascertaining which was the rule and which the exception. That
is, are automobiles subject to a warrantless search except when
they are found in the curtilage of the owner's home, or is a
warrant required unless automobiles are stopped while moving
on a highway? That question was answered rather definitively
8 when it
by the Court in the 1985 case of California v. Carney,1
upheld the search of a motor home that was parked in a public
parking lot with its curtains drawn.' 9
Because mobility is such an important factor in allowing
warrantless automobile searches, the Court rightly refused to
draw a distinction between motor homes and other motor
vehicles. Less rightly, it refused to even cite Coolidge in holding
that a vehicle "found stationary in a place not regularly used for
residential purposes '20 is subject to a warrantless search. In so
holding, the Court emphasized the lesser expectation of privacy
that one has in a vehicle on or capable of going onto a highway.
Unfortunately, the Court never explained why, despite this
lesser expectation, it was necessary to subject this vehicle to a
warrantless search. Nor did it feel the need to address Justice
Stevens' unquestionably correct observation that "the motor
home was parked in an off-the-street lot only a few blocks from
the courthouse in downtown San Diego where dozens of
magistrates were available to entertain a warrant application." 21
Thus, we are left with the conclusion that any warrantless
search of an automobile, based on probable cause, will be
sustained unless the vehicle is parked in the curtilage of the
owner's home.2 2 On the other hand, so long as probable cause is
required, the balance arguably is not all that askew. 23 In the
Id. at 461-62.
471 U.S. 386 (1985).
19 See id. at 395, 404.
20 Id. at 392.
21 Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22 It remains to be seen whether this exception will be extended to private
parking places in apartment complexes or offices. With the short shrift the Court
gave Coolidge in Carney, I frankly doubt it.
23 Obviously this depends on the importance one attaches to a warrant. To put
17
18

2002]

COP, CARS, AND CITIZENS

next two sections, I will focus on automobile searches or seizures
that have been permitted without probable cause or a warrant.
B.

Inventory Searches

The concept of an inventory search is that there are certain
caretaking functions, as opposed to evidence-seeking functions,
that the police must perform on impounded automobiles.
Because the police, at least in theory, are not seeking and do not
expect to find evidence, the concept of probable cause, by
definition, cannot be relevant to an inventory search.
Furthermore, because probable cause is not relevant to an
inventory search, neither is the requirement of a warrant to the
extent that it is predicated upon probable cause. 24 Thus, if
inventory searches are to be allowed at all, some standard other
than the traditional probable cause/warrant standard is
necessary to ascertain permissibility.
As with warrantless probable cause searches, the Court
began cautiously 25 and then significantly expanded police
power. 26 Despite a subsequent mild correction,27 the power of

it mildly, neither the Court nor its critics have agreed on this question. It is not my
purpose to debate that issue in this Article. It is, however, worth mentioning that
some of the values of a warrant include having a neutral third party make the
probable cause determination before the search takes place, preventing a post hoc
rationalization of probable cause that didn't actually exist, giving both the officer
and searchee notice of the authority to search along with its scope and limitations,
and ensuring that the search will not take place unless the officer believes that it is
important enough to take the trouble to prepare an affidavit.
24 Of course, the Fourth Amendment provides: "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although administrative warrants
have expanded the concept of probable cause beyond that which a criminal evidence
warrant would recognize, see Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,387 U.S.
523 (1967), that expansion is likely to be tightly cabined. See Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868 (1987). In any event, it is hard to see any utility to a warrant where it
is conceded that the officer lacks a probable cause to believe that any particular
thing would be found. Indeed, any warrant that might be granted would be of the
"general" variety that were so odious to the Framers of the Constitution.
25 See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976) (discussing the
reasonableness of inventories pursuant to standard police procedures).
2G See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) (giving great leeway under
the Fourth Amendment to reasonable inventory procedures administered in "good
faith").
27 See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990) (finding a search conducted in the
absence of a policy regarding the opening of closed containers during an inventory
search failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:535

inventory searches contributes significantly to the nightmare
28
described in Part I of this Article.
In 1976, for the first time, the Court upheld inventory
searches conducted pursuant to standard police procedures.2 9 In
South Dakota v. Opperman,30 it upheld the inventory search of a
31
car towed to the impound lot for extended overtime parking.
The Court relied on the need to protect: (1) the car owner from
having his property stolen; 32 (2) the police from false claims of
stolen property; and (3) the police (and presumably the public)
33
from injury.
The narrowness of the decision was underscored by Justice
Powell's concurrence, which emphasized the non-amenability to
the warrant process, the lack of an evidence-seeking motive, the
absence of and inability to locate the owner, and the virtual
absence of discretion of the police officer. 34 Indeed, the entire
Court seemed to emphasize the inability of the police to find the
owner. This narrow focus was nowhere to be found eleven years
35
later when the Court decided Colorado v. Bertine.
Whether Bertine is characterized an unmitigated disaster or
merely as an unfortunate decision depends on whether one
focuses on what the Court in fact allowed or on what it purported
to allow. In fact, the Court allowed an "inventory"36 search of a

28

See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001), discussed infra Part

III.C.

29 On three prior occasions, the Court upheld inventory searches in special
circumstances. In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the Court upheld the
inventory search of a car that had been seized pursuant to the commencement of
forfeiture proceedings. In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), the Court
upheld the inventory search of a car that had been seized because it was used in a
robbery. Finally, in Cady v.Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the Court upheld the
inventory search of the rented car of an unconscious off-duty Chicago police officer
in a rural Wisconsin town because the police believed that the police officer had a
service revolver in the car that they were unable to locate.
30 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
31 The car had already received two tickets and remained in the same unlawful
spot. See id. at 365-66.
32 The impound lot was encircled by a dilapidated and easy to enter fence, and
there had been instances of larceny from cars impounded there. Id. at 366 n.1.
33 See id. at 369.
34 See id. at 376-84. Justice Powell's concurrence was necessary to make a fiveto-four majority.

35 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
36 1 put the term "inventory" in quotes because, as Justice Marshall's dissenting
opinion clearly demonstrates, this was not an inventory search at all. See id. at 377
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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van whose driver was arrested for driving under the influence.
The officer conducting the inventory testified that he had the
option of parking the van in an adjoining park-and-lock parking
37
lot or impounding the car and conducting an inventory search.
The arresting officer testified that the scope of an inventory is
"very individualistic" and is dependent on "whatever arouses his
suspicious [sic]."38 The "inventory" was in fact conducted in a
manner totally consistent with an evidence search, finding
cocaine and $700 in a backpack, and totally inconsistent with a
bona fide inventory search. 39 Ironically, this search could have
been sustained incident to Bertine's arrest if it had been
40
conducted substantially contemporaneously therewith.
In form, the Court's opinion does not appear to countenance
the unbridled discretion exercised here. The Court purports to
require standardized criteria to guide the officer's discretion on
whether to impound or not to impound. Unfortunately, the
criteria, the safety and convenience of the park-and-lock lot and
the consent of the owner, both militate against the decision to
inventory; however, that did not bother the Court. Even more
pointed was Justice Blackmun's concurrence, emphasizing the
importance of allowing "police officers to open closed containers
in an inventory search only if they are following standardized
police procedures that mandate the opening of such containers in
37 Id. at 379-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38

Id. at 381 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

39

Officer Reichenbach's inventory in this case would not have protected the
police against claims lodged by respondent, false or otherwise. Indeed, the
trial court's characterization of the inventory as 'slip-shod' is the height of
understatement. For example, Officer Reichenbach failed to list $150 in
cash found in respondent's wallet or the contents of a sealed envelope
marked 'rent,' $210, in the relevant section of the property form. His
reports make no reference to other items of value, including respondent's
credit cards, a converter, a hydraulic jack, and a set of tire chains, worth a
total of $125. The $700 in cash found in respondent's backpack, along with
the contraband, appeared only on a property form completed later by
someone other than Officer Reichenbach. The interior of the vehicle was
left in disarray, and the officer 'inadvertently' retained respondent's keysincluding his house keys-for two days following his arrest.
Id. at 383 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
4o See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981); discussion infra Part II.D.
It is not clear why Colorado did not rely on this rationale. One possibility is that the
inventory search was not sufficiently contemporaneous with the arrest to qualify.
Another is that the scope of a Belton search in the interior of a van may have been
sufficiently problematic to discourage such reliance.
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every impounded vehicle." 41 Given that Justice Blackmun's
opinion was necessary to make a majority, 42 there appears to be
a major disconnect between what the Court said it would allow
and what the Court did allow.
Finally, in Florida v. Wells, 43 the Court split the difference
between the legal and factual holdings in Bertine. Rejecting the
Florida Supreme Court's holding that a police officer could never
exercise discretion in conducting an inventory search, the Court
nevertheless upheld Florida's reversal of Wells' conviction
because Florida had absolutely no policy on inventory searches,
thus granting Florida police officers complete unchanneled
44
discretion.
Wells is one of those cases with something for everyone.
From the libertarian perspective, the Court laid the worst fears
from Bertine to rest. The Court clearly held that unchanneled
discretion is not permitted. From the police perspective, the
Court gave assurances that some discretion is permitted. 45 In
practical terms, the effect of Bertine and Wells is that so long as
a police department has a policy of opening all containers in an
impounded car, such action will be upheld no matter how
unreasonable. For example, in Wells, two police officers spent
ten minutes prying open a locked suitcase, admittedly looking for
drugs. 46 If the police department's official policy called for
opening all containers in an impounded vehicle, it is highly
unlikely that a court would invalidate such a search. Of course,
where the officer does not think that he will find contraband,
nobody is likely to challenge his failure to "inventory" the
containers in the vehicle.
The amount of discretion actually available to the police to
conduct inventory searches strongly contributes to the potential
nightmare scenario described in the introduction to this article.
When coupled with an unchanneled power to arrest for traffic
offenses, 47 it powerfully contributes to the broken balance
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 377 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
He was joined by Justices Powell and O'Connor. Justices Marshall and
Brennan dissented. Thus, there were only four Justices that did not join either the
concurrence or the dissent.
41

42

43 495 U.S. 1 (1990).

The Court called it "uncanalized." Id. at 4.
See id. at 4-5.
46 Id. at 7 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Arkansas v. Sullivan,
44

45
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between police and citizens in regard to encounters on the
highway.
C. Roadblocks
To the extent that the police are free to stop all traffic at a
roadblock, the police/citizen balance is obviously affected.
Certain types of stops have never been deemed problematic.
Weigh stations for trucks and border stops for all vehicles have
always been in this category. Fixed checkpoints near the border
are more questionable, but have been upheld on the theory that
they are closely akin to border stops. Additionally, the populace
is aware of their existence and unlikely to be unduly alarmed or
48
inconvenienced by them.
Surprise stops present a different problem. An unsuspecting
traveler who is stopped by a police officer and, for no particular
reason, is asked to display a license, submit to a sobriety test, or
submit to a drug search, may feel frightened, offended, or worse.
The police, on the other hand, may claim that such stops are
necessary to control unlicensed driving, drunk driving, and drug
trafficking. The Supreme Court has permitted some, but not all,
of these roadblocks, with the center of the Court at least trying
to hold the balance true.
In 1979, the Court examined the constitutionality of random
stops in Delaware v. Prouse.49 Taking the libertarian interest in
50
automobiles more seriously than at any time since Coolidge,
the Court held that a random stop of an automobile, not
apparently violating any traffic law, was insufficiently likely to
produce evidence of lack of licensure to justify the Fourth
Amendment cost to the driver. 5 1 With a level of seriousness that
would have rendered this Article unnecessary had it been
consistently followed, the Court observed:

532 U.S. 769 (2001); discussion infra Part III.
48 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (emphasizing the
limitations on the scope of checkpoint stops). But see Justice Thomas's dissent in
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 56 (2000) (suggesting that MartinezFuerte should be rethought).
49 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
50 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); see discussion supra Part
II.A.
51 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (holding that there must be "at least [an]
articulable and reasonable suspicion" for the stop to be proper).
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An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not
lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the
automobile and its use are subject to government regulation.
Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary
mode of transportation to and from one's home, workplace, and
leisure activities. Many people spend more hours each day
traveling in cars than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly,
many find a greater sense of security and privacy in traveling
in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves by
pedestrian or other modes of travel. Were the individual subject
to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an
automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
would be seriously circumscribed.... [Pleople are not shorn of
all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their
homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those
interests when they step from the sidewalks into their
52
automobiles.
Though invalidating the random stop in Prouse, the Court
went out of its way to suggest the constitutionality of a roadblock
53
at which all traffic is stopped in order to check for licensure.
Obviously, the Court thought that if everybody were stopped,
then the harm done to each stopped individual would be less.
Additionally, the Court seemed impressed with the absence of
discretion inherent in such a stop. 54 Thus, a parallel between
inventory searches and roadblocks-unchanneled discretion
forbidden, but subjecting everyone to the same search
(inventory) or seizure (roadblock)-is allowed. Although Justice
Rehnquist, in his dissent, referred to this as the "misery loves
company"55 rule, it does represent an effort to honor his
admonition of "hold[ing] the balance true."
The wisdom and constitutionality of roadblocks were hotly
debated eleven years later in Michigan v. Sitz. 56 The Court, with
now Chief Justice Rehnquist writing the opinion, held that the

52
53

Id. at 662-63 (citations omitted).
See id. at 663.

54 See id. (suggesting the alternative of stopping all oncoming traffic as a
method that does not involve the "unconstrained exercise of discretion"); see also id.
at 661 (noting that spot checks involve the "[k]ind of standardless and
unconstrained discretion [that] is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous
cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed at
least to some extent").
55 Id. at 664.
56 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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constitutionality of a sobriety roadblock should be measured by
"'balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by
drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in
achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion on an individual's
privacy caused by the checkpoints.' -57
Justice Stevens, while not seriously quarreling with the
test,58 had a great deal of justified criticisms for the Court's
application thereof. He noted that the element of surprise
clearly distinguishes a secret checkpoint from a known one. By
emphasizing the adverse psychological impact that such an
encounter can have on an innocent driver, he demonstrated that
the Court clearly undervalued the harm done to an unsuspecting
driver. 59 Moreover, he demonstrated that the Court overvalued
the benefits of sobriety checkpoints by crediting the arrests made
during the checkpoint, but failing to debit the arrests not made
60
while the officers were manning the checkpoint.
Finally, in City of Indianapolisv. Edmond,61 the Court held
that the propriety of a Sitz-type roadblock was the exception and
not the rule. Emphasizing that the rule is that there are to be no
stops on less than reasonable suspicion, the Court held that a
57 Id. at 449 (quoting the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was describing the
three-prong balancing test of Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)).
58Justice Brennan did quarrel with the test, suggesting that balancing should
not be the norm. See id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I am inclined to agree
with the Court and Justice Stevens in applying the test. If one is to hold the balance
true, the Court's test seems to identify the relevant factors in assessing
reasonableness").
59

These fears are not, as the Court would have it, solely the lot of the guilty.
To be law abiding is not necessarily to be spotless, and even the most
virtuous can be unlucky. Unwanted attention from the local police need not
be less discomforting simply because one's secrets are not the stuff of
criminal prosecutions. Moreover, those who have found-by reason of
prejudice or misfortune-that encounters with the police may become
adversarial or unpleasant without good cause will have grounds for
worrying at any stop designed to elicit signs of suspicious behavior. Being
stopped by the police is distressing even when it should not be terrifying,
and what begins mildly may by happenstance turn severe.
Id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
60There were nineteen officers present at the checkpoint for about an hour,
resulting in the arrest of two drivers and the detention of about 125 others.
Ordinarily, at least eight officers were scheduled to man the checkpoints. Id. at 460
n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Presumably had they been patrolling and not at the
checkpoint, those officers would have arrested some unknown number of people
caught in the act of drunk driving.
61 531 U.S. 32 (2000).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:535

roadblock designed primarily to interdict drugs was
unconstitutional. 6 2 Arguably Edmond was more about form than
substance; the basis of the roadblock's invalidation was its
primary purpose of interdicting drugs, which is generally related
to law enforcement as opposed to specifically related to highway
safety. Presumably, a roadblock designed to check licensure or
sobriety, at which drug sniffing dogs were stationed, 63 would be
controlled by Sitz rather than Edmond.
Notwithstanding this limitation, Edmond demonstrated an
important commitment to holding the balance true.
By
emphasizing the general need for at least reasonable suspicion,
the rights of the motoring public were at least given the
appearance of being taken seriously. Unfortunately, just four
64
months later, the Court gave us Atwater.
D. Search Incident to an Arrest
The scope of a search incident to arrest for a traffic offense
was first litigated in the Supreme Court in companion 1973
66
cases: United States v. Robinson65 and Gustafson v. Florida.
The officer who arrested Robinson unquestionably had probable
67
cause to believe that he was driving with a revoked license.
Inasmuch as District of Columbia police regulations required a
full custody arrest for this offense, 68 one cannot fault the officer
for effectuating one. 69 The issue was the propriety of searching
Robinson incident to his valid arrest. The Government conceded
70
that Robinson could have no evidence of crime on his person.
62 Id. at 48 (observing that "the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint
program is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control").
63 Drug sniffing dogs do not constitute a Fourth Amendment "search." See
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV 1229, 1272
(1983) (commenting that such searches are permissible because they do not intrude
upon the rights of the innocent).
64 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); see discussion infra Part
III.B.
65 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
66 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
67 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220 (noting that the officer had previously checked
Robinson's license just four days earlier).
68 Id. at 222-23 n.2.
69 Even without such a regulation, it would be difficult to fault the officer. He
surely could not send the driver home, knowing that he used a phony license in
place of the one that had been revoked.
70 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233. Arguably, the Government was incorrect. It is
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Thus, Robinson argued that he could only be subject to Terry
72
frisk, 71 as opposed to a search incident to an arrest.
The Supreme Court, correctly in my view, rejected this
argument, holding instead that an arrest creates a bright line
rule allowing a search of the arrestee and the immediately
surrounding area without any additional justification.
The
Court recognized the need for an officer in close proximity to a
suspect to be assured that the suspect will not be armed.
Beyond that, at least two other values justify the result. One is
the bright line rule that makes it unnecessary for a police officer
to have to exercise too much individual judgment. 73 The other is
the possibility that evidence could be secreted on the suspect
when nobody suspects it.74
Gustafson involved an arrest for driving without possession
of a driver's license. Although Gustafson might have challenged
the legality of his arrest because he had explained that he was a
college student who left his driver's license in his dorm room,
and the officer never claimed that he believed that Gustafson
75
was in fact unlicensed, Gustafson never made such a challenge.
Instead the case played out simply as Robinson redux, holding
that given the legality of the arrest, the search incident was also

at least theoretically possible that Robinson could have had other false driver's
licenses on his person.
71 See id; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A Terry frisk consists of a pat down
for weapons. The police are permitted to look for anything that feels like a weapon,
but may not look for anything beyond that. Further, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 64 (1968), the Court noted that a Terry frisk is limited to when an officer can
reasonably infer that the individual is armed and dangerous.
72 A search incident to an arrest entitles the police officer to search the person
and his immediate surroundings for any weapons or evidence of crime. See Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
73 1 sometimes call this the "poor dumb cop" rule. This rule basically suggests
that if Supreme Court Justices with all of their time, law clerks, and education
cannot agree on a course of action, how can a police officer with a relatively limited
education be expected to make a quick balance on the spur of the moment with too
many rules. Wayne LaFave puts it this way: "[Ensuring that] lawyers and judges 'in
the peace of a quiet chamber' would agree with the spur of the moment decision of
the cop on the beat ... can only be achieved if the courts continue with the
challenging task of articulating reasonable and understandable limits upon police
authority, using carefully conceived 'bright lines' whenever feasible." Wayne
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing 'BrightLines'
and 'Good Faith,43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 360-61 (1982) (citation omitted).
74 See supra note 62.
75 See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 262 (1973); see also id. at 266-67
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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legal. 76 Thus, the Court missed an early opportunity to limit
77
unchanneled police discretion in effectuating arrests.
Eight years later the Court decided its final (to date)
significant search incident to arrest in an automobile case. New
York v. Belton 78 was an easy case to justify the arrest. Belton
was stopped for speeding on the highway. The officer then
smelled marijuana, saw a package labeled "supergold," and
observed marijuana butts in the ashtray. Thus, Belton and his
79
passengers were arrested for possession of marijuana.
The hard question in Belton was the scope of the subsequent
80 had held that
search. An earlier decision, Chimel v. California,
a search incident to an arrest could encompass only the area
within immediate grabbing distance of the suspect.8 1 In order to
create a bright line rule for the police,8 2 the Belton Court held
that anything found in the passenger compartment of the car
qualified as within the grabbing distance authorized by Chimel.
Belton was an unfortunate decision for at least three
reasons. First, it failed on its own terms to create a true bright
line decision. Its enigmatic footnote four suggested that any
container found in the car, but not the trunk, was covered by the
scope of its decision:
"Container" here denotes any object capable of holding another
object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments,
consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the
76 Id. at 266.
77 The Court may well have been willing to do this. In addition to there being
three dissenting Justices, Justice Stewart opined: "It seems to me that a persuasive
claim might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest of the petitioner
for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 266-267 (Stewart, J., concurring). As Justice Powell observed in
Robinson: "Gustafson would have presented a different question if the petitioner
could have proved that he was taken into custody only to afford a pretext for a
search actually undertaken for collateral objectives." 414 U.S. 218, 238 n.2 (Powell,
J., concurring). As Anthony Amsterdam observed, shortly after Robinson and
Gustafson: "If the Court had distinguished the two cases on this ground, it would, in
my judgment, have made by far the greatest contribution to the jurisprudence of the
fourth amendment since James Otis argued against the writs of assistance in 1761
and 'the child Independence was born.'" Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 416 (1974) (citation omitted) (quoting

LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 107 (1965)).
78

453 U.S. 454 (1981).

79 Id. at 455-56.
80 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
81 See id. at 763.
82

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags,
clothing, and the like. Our holding encompasses only the
interior of the passenger compartment of an automobile and
83
does not encompass the trunk.

Hence, the question of whether it includes locked as well as
closed glove compartments and containers remains.8

4

Similarly

unsettled is the status of trunks on hatchbacks that can be
accessed from the car, the interior of motor homes,8 5 and the
interior of vans.8 6 While one cannot and should not demand
perfection from Supreme Court opinions, one would think that a
decision whose whole raison d'etre is creating a bright line would
do better than this.
The second unfortunate aspect of Belton was the lack of
necessity to predicate a lawful search on such an expansive view
of a search incident to an arrest. Justice Stevens convincingly
demonstrated that classic automobile search law would permit a
search of the jacket pockets upheld in Belton.8 7 It was only
because of an extravagant pro-citizen/anti-police view of the
right to search containers found in cars,88 later overruled,8 9 that

83 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4.
84

Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (emphasizing the

expectation of privacy in a double-locked foot locker).
85 Cf. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1985), discussed supra Part
II.A.
86 Cf. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987), discussed supra Part II.B.
87 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 444 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
This dissenting opinion included his concurrence in Belton. Of course, Carroll and
Chambers would have upheld this search.
88 In Arkansas v. Sanders, the Court invalidated the search of a suitcase found
in the trunk of a cab. 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979). The Court reasoned that while the
search of the cab was a valid Carroll search, the search of the container (suitcase)
was governed by United States v. Chadwick, 443 U.S. 1 (1977), which had
disallowed the warrantless search of a double locked foot locker removed from a
train and placed in the trunk of a car. Neither Chadwick nor Sanders directly
threatened Carroll because, in both Chadwick and Sanders, the probable cause for
the container was obtained before the container was placed in the car and
independent of the car. In Robbins v. California, a companion case to Belton, the
Court held that a closed container, found in the recessed luggage compartment of a
station wagon, could not be searched even with probable cause. The Court reasoned
that closed containers were controlled by Chadwick/ Sanders rather than Carroll.
See Robbins, 453 U.S. at 424-25.
89 Robbins was overruled the next year in United States. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
824 (1982), which held that probable cause to look in the trunk of a car for drugs
also justified looking in a paper bag found in the trunk of that car even though the
police had not obtained a warrant. Id. at 822. Eventually, Sanders was also
overruled. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991).
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compelled the Court to rely on search incident to uphold the
search in Belton.90 Unfortunately, even though the search in
Belton could now be sustained on the basis of probable cause,
there has been no suggestion that the expansive search incident
to arrest rationale be reconsidered.
The most significant failing of Belton, especially for purposes
of this Article, is that it put no limitation on the types of crime
for which an arrest could be made. The Court unfortunately did
not hold that minor traffic offenders were free from arrest. 9 1
Thus, Belton created the potential for that portion of the
nightmare scenario that allows a police officer to search the
entire passenger compartment of the car of an arrestee for a
minor traffic offense. 92
Of course that potential did not
eventuate until Atwater v. Lago Vista, when the coup de grace
93
was delivered.
E.

Consent

The concept of a consent search sounds salutary. The
conflict between police officer and citizen is gone, and the two are
working together for the common goal of creating a better
society. Perhaps, instead of the nightmare scenario suggested at
the beginning of this Article, 94 it might look something like this:
Police officer: You were going thirty-five mph in a twenty-five
mph zone. We really can't have that.
You: I understand officer. Thanks for calling it to my attention.
Police officer: While I have you stopped do you mind if I look in
the trunk of your car? You don't have to, but it would be helpful
to me if you would consent.
You: I don't have anything in there, but if you want to look, it's
fine with me.
Police officer (after viewing empty trunk): Thanks for your help.
Now remember no more speeding.
90 Robbins and Belton taken together worked something of a compromise. An
arrest rendered the containers in the passenger compartment fair game. Containers
found in the trunk, however, could be searched only with a warrant.
91 See Justice Stevens' dissent in Robbins, 453 U.S. at 450 n.11 and
accompanying text, which includes his concurrence in Belton, emphasizing this
point.
92 See supra Part I.
93 See infra Part III.B.
94 See supra Part I.
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The problem is that the hypothesized scenario is not what
typically happens. Instead, a truly voluntary consent, while
perhaps not oxymoronic, certainly does not seem to be the rule,
95
at least according to the defendants in the litigated cases.
The current law of consent searches skews the balance
against the citizen in three ways. First, the police are not
required to tell the citizen that he is free to say "no."96 Second,
the police are not required to tell the suspect that she is free to
leave even when the law permits no further detention. 97 Third,
the question of whether consent was freely given is a factual
question whose resolution is usually stacked in a way to ensure a
98
win for the police.
Let us first examine Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,99 a case
holding that a suspect need not be told that he has a right to say
no. The Court described the facts as follows:
While on routine patrol in Sunnyvale, California, at
approximately 2:40 in the morning, Police Officer James Rand
stopped an automobile when he observed that one headlight
and its license plate light were burned out. Six men were in the
vehicle. Joe Alcala and the respondent, Robert Bustamonte,
were in the front seat with Joe Gonzales, the driver. Three
older men were seated in the rear. When, in response to the
policeman's question, Gonzales could not produce a driver's

license, Officer Rand asked if any of the other five had any
evidence of identification. Only Alcala produced a license, and
he explained that the car was his brother's. After the six
95 See United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2114 (2002) (finding consent
voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances even though the suspects were
not told they had a right to refuse the search); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40
(1996) (holding that " '[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all
the circumstances'" (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49
(1973))); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1991) (rejecting defendant's
argument that he was seized because a reasonable person would not consent to a
search of luggage that they know contains drugs); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 558-59 (1980) (finding no coercion where the defendant was twice
informed that she could withhold her consent, after which she explicitly gave her
consent); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 230 (1973) (noting that the
Court has not adopted a "litmus-paper test" for voluntariness because it will impose
too high of a burden on prosecutors).
9GSchneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 ("While knowledge of the right to refuse consent
is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such
knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.").
97 See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35 (1996).
98 See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230-31.
99 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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occupants had stepped out of the car at the officer's request and
after two additionalpolicemen had arrived, Officer Rand asked
Alcala if he could search the car. Alcala replied, "Sure, go
ahead." Prior to the search no one was threatened with arrest
and, according to Officer Rand's uncontradicted testimony, it
"was all very congenial at this time." Gonzales testified that
Alcala actually helped in the search of the car, by opening the
trunk and glove compartment. In Gonzales' words: "[T]he
police officer asked Joe [Alcala], he goes, 'Does the trunk open?'
And Joe said, 'Yes.' He went to the car and got the keys and
opened up the trunk." Wadded up under the left rear seat, the
police officers found three checks that had previously been
stolen from a car wash. 100

From the detainees' perspective, there was little that
appeared voluntary. They were stopped at 2:40 in the morning,
asked (ordered?) to exit the car, and witnessed the arrival of two
reinforcement police officers. They were then asked to search
the car without being told that "no" was an option. Can anyone
not thoroughly steeped in legal fiction really believe that they
thought "no" was one of their options? Surely they must have
believed that "yes" was the only acceptable answer. 10 1
Obviously much of this sense of inevitability could have been
overcome by a simple admonition that the detainee need not
consent. The Court's suggestion that such an admonition would
destroy the informality of the interchange and be thoroughly
impractical 10 2 is so palpably false as to be laughable. A simple
"I'd like you to let me search your car Joe, but you don't have to"
would add to the informality, while minimizing the show of force.
Of course, it would also decrease the number of consent searches,
which is a result that the Court seemed to fear when it
emphasized: "Consent searches are part of the standard
10 3
investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies."
Not knowing of the right to say "no" is bad enough, but the
Court has also held that one need not be told that he is free to go
even if he is. In Ohio v. Robinette,10 4 the Court held that after a
100Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
101This conclusion would certainly be buttressed by their apparent ethnicity.
Assuming that they were Hispanic, as their surnames suggest, and that Officer
Rand was Anglo, the conclusion hypothesized in the text would be even more

irresistible.
102

103
104

See Schenckloth, 412 U.S. at 231.
Id. at 231-32.
519 U.S. 33 (1996).
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suspect had been given a traffic ticket, 10 5 the police officer was
free to ask him for consent to search his vehicle. The Court did
not hold that a police officer has a right to detain a suspect after
he was ticketed. Rather, it objected to what it perceived as
Ohio's per se rule that a detainee must be told that he is free to
go before he can be asked for consent to search. 10 6 Justice
Stevens dissented on the ground that the detainee was not in
fact free to go at the time that he was asked for consent to
search. 10 7 Thus, Justice Stevens viewed the case as one in which
the consent to search was the product of an illegal detention. In
08
such a case, the consent to search is per se invalid.
Justice Stevens was clearly correct. Before the police officer
asked for consent, he said: "[B]efore you get gone." 10 9 Surely, a
reasonable person would have thought that he was not free to
leave at that point. Yet the Court's holding assumed that a
person would know that he was free to leave without being told,
even though most people who have been stopped understand
that they are not free to leave until the police officer tells them
so. Thus, the Court upheld this consent, not on the theory that
Robinette was lawfully detained, but on the theory that he was
not being detained at all. The only problem with that rationale
is that it was not true.
A final problem with consent searches is the manner in
which the underlying question of consent is determined. The
court must decide from frequently conflicting accounts whether
consent was given. Rarely, if ever, does the question arise
outside of the criminal context. To illustrate why this is so,
consider the experience of a former law student. While in
college, this student was driving with some friends through a
bad neighborhood in Chicago. When his car stalled, he turned
into a cul-de-sac and asked a police officer to call AAA. Instead
of calling for assistance, the police officer looked through his car,
including the glove compartment, and asked: "Is there anything
in here that shouldn't be?" Though tempted to answer: "Yes,

In this case the suspect was given a warning. Id. at 35.
See id. at 39.
107 See id. at 46-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108 See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983) (noting that consent
tainted by illegality is an ineffective justification for a search).
109Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35.
105

106
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you," the student prudently answered: "No sir," whereupon the
police officer left. 110
The student, eager to leave the area, fortunately was able to
start his car and drive away. He expressed no desire to sue the
police officer but even if he had, the likelihood of finding an
attorney to litigate the case on a contingent-fee basis would have
been very small. Consequently, a case like this would only reach
court if the police officer had found drugs. In that case, it is
highly likely that the police officer would claim that the student
had consented. The student would deny giving consent. The
trial judge would have to assess the credibility of the parties,
knowing that if he chooses to believe the defendant, a criminal
would go free. Of course, the very fact that he was found in
possession of drugs diminishes his credibility. Because police
officers know this, they are free to behave in the manner
described, secure in the knowledge that if they find nothing, the
searchee will go away, but if they find drugs, the court will
believe that the driver consented."'
I do not mean to suggest that the officer is always, or even
usually, lying. Those caught with drugs have a great deal of
incentive to lie, and their credibility should be at least as suspect
as the police officer's. My concern is the potential impact
consent searches can have on innocent drivers. 112 Videotaping
would help, but it is rarely done. 113 If the Court would require a
signed consent form, the problem would be ameliorated. 114
Unfortunately, such a requirement is unlikely for the reasons
110 The police officer, who happened to be black, explained his suspicions to the
student by stating: "The only time white boys ever come into this neighborhood is
for drugs or sex."
111 Cf State v. Kremen, 754 A.2d 964 (Me. 2000). In Kremen, the defendant
testified that she had been threatened with arrest if she did not consent to a search,
while the officer testified that no such threat was made. Id. at 967. To no one's
surprise, the trial judge believed the police officer. The court found the officer's
testimony sufficient to support the finding that the defendant voluntarily consented
to a search of her vehicle. Id. at 968.
112 Although only criminal defendants can take advantage of the exclusionary
rule, the ultimate beneficiary of the rule is the innocent driver who will not be
searched by a police officer who knows that any evidence she finds will not be
admissible. See Loewy, supra note 63, at 1272 (noting that the Fourth Amendment
is designed to protect the innocent).
113 Note, however, that the incident was videotaped in Robinette. See 519 U.S.
at 46 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 But it would not be completely cured because there would still be the issue
of coerced signatures.
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that permeate Schneckloth and Robinette, namely the
desirability of consent and the concomitant reduction of
"consent" searches caused by additional predicates to their
propriety.
F.

Whren v. United States

Whren v. United States115 held that a pretextual stop, even
contrary to department policy, did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. With surprising unanimity, the Court seemed
either oblivious to, or unconcerned with, its implicit sanctioning
of unbridled arbitrariness or racial profiling 16 in upholding the
constitutionality of a stop by plain clothes vice squad officers to
issue a traffic warning to individuals whom they suspected of
117
drug dealing.
The stop in Whren could have been upheld without creating
such a window of arbitrariness. The defendants were stopped at
a stop sign for twenty seconds as the driver looked at the
passenger's lap. When the unmarked police car made a u-turn to
investigate further, the petitioners' vehicle suddenly turned
right without signaling and sped away. 118 The Court has found
similar furtive gestures to constitute reasonable suspicion for an
investigatory stop"19 and could have done so here. Alternatively,
it could have conceivably held that Brown, the driver in Whren,
was driving in such a manner as to pose "an immediate threat,"
in which case the stop would not have been in violation of the
20
D.C. police directive.1

115

517 U.S. 806 (1996).
It is unlikely that the Court was oblivious to the potential for racial profiling
in light of the arguments of petitioner and its own acknowledgment of the
116

possibility. See id. at 810. The Court was more likely unconcerned with the issue.
117 See id. at 818 (finding that a traffic stop made by an out of uniform officer
does not constitute an extreme practice justifying a "balancing" analysis, but rather
is governed by "the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has been
broken 'outbalances' private interest in avoiding police contact").
'I8 Id. at 808.
119 See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (commenting

on the evasive maneuvers of a defendant in evaluating the reasonableness of an
investigative stop).
120 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 (quoting Metropolitan Police Department,
Washington, D.C., General Order 303.1 pt. 1 Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(4) (Apr.
30, 1992) (emphasis omitted)).
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By holding instead that any police officer can stop any
suspect at any time for any traffic offense, the Court, quite
unnecessarily, set the stage for the ultimate coup de grace.
III. THE COUP DE GRACE
While Whren set the stage for the ultimate coup de grace, it
did not guarantee it. The balanced roadblock cases' 2 ' require, at
least, uniformity. 22 Even the inventory cases, which created
such a significant piece of the nightmare, require channeled
discretion. 123 Consequently, the coup de grace, while plausible,
was hardly inevitable. Indeed, in the first case that posed an
opportunity to create an open season on motorists, the Court
unanimously and forthrightly refused to do so.
A.

The Benign Prequel

Knowles v. Iowa, 124 a unanimous opinion written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, involved an Iowa statute that permitted
arrests for traffic offenses and permitted full searches incident to
a traffic citation where the officer chose not to make an arrest.
The Iowa Supreme Court reasoned that because the police officer
was authorized to make an arrest and free to search the suspect
and car incident thereto, 25 the lesser intrusion of a search
incident to a citation was not constitutionally problematic. 126
A court wishing to overturn this decision could have done so
on one of two grounds. It could have held that the Iowa statute
permitting arrest for a minor traffic offense in the unfettered
discretion of the police officer was unconstitutional. Thus, there
would have been no basis for a trickle down search incident to a
citation. Alternatively, it could have held that whatever the
power to arrest or search incident thereto may be, there was no
power to search when the officer does not in fact arrest.
Consistent with its time-honored practice of deciding no more

These cases are not necessarily perfectly balanced. See supra Part II.C.
Even uniformity, however, might not suffice. See City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42, 47 (2000); supra Part II.C.
123 See supra Part II.B.
124 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
125 The Iowa court cited New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
126 State v. Knowles, 569 N.W.2d 601, 602-03 (Iowa 1997), rev'd, Knowles v.
Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
121
122
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than is necessary to resolve the case before it, 1 27 it opted for the
latter alternative, leaving open the question of the
constitutionality of unbridled discretion to arrest for a traffic
offense.
Notwithstanding the narrowness of the opinion, Knowles
was one case in which the Court in general, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in particular, took seriously the admonition of holding
the balance true. Emphasizing the lack of need to search either
for the protection of the officer or for the discovery of evidence,
the Court forthrightly held that the balance favored the
citizen. 128 Thus, there was good reason to believe that the Fourth
Amendment would continue to meaningfully limit police control
over motorists. But, alas, the coup de grace lay just beyond the
horizon. Less than three years after Knowles, it reared its ugly
head.
B. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 129 involved a real life
nightmare that dwarfed the hypothesized one imagined at the
beginning of this Article. 130 Gail Atwater and her two small
children lost a toy that was attached to the outside of her truck
while driving home from soccer practice. While retracing her
route in an effort to find it, she permitted her children to
unbuckle their seatbelts-a move that did not sit well with
Officer Bart Turek of the Lago Vista police. 131 Turek, who was
unqualified to don the uniform of the neighboring Austin police
force, 132 stopped Ms. Atwater, yelled at her, frightened her
127

This principle arguably necessitated by the logic of Marbury v. Madison, 5

U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), has been (at least in theory) part of the Supreme Court's
practice since at least Justice Brandeis' famous concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority. See 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("'[It is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question
may be avoided.'" (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932))).
128 "Here we are asked to extend the 'bright-line rule' to a situation where the
concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent [as in Robinson] and the
concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all. We decline to do so."
Knowles, 525 U.S. at 118-19.
129 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
130 See supra Part I.
131 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 248 (5th Cir.1999) (Weiner,
J., dissenting), aff'd, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
132 At least according to the affidavit of Keith Campbell, a recruiter for the
Austin police, who was given a copy of Turek's file for this litigation. See id. at 247
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children, informed her that she would be arrested, and denied
her the opportunity to leave her children with a neighbor. 133
Turek then placed the handcuffed Atwater in the back of his
cruiser, failed to fasten her seatbelt, drove her to the police
station where she was fingerprinted, required to remove her
shoes and glasses, and placed in a cell for an hour before she was
released on bond. 3 4 Believing this treatment to be a tad
unreasonable, she sued. The Supreme Court, by a five-to-four
vote, found nothing constitutionally unreasonable in the above
scenario.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Souter saw the case as
presenting a conflict between the desire for a bright line rule on
the one hand and justice for Ms. Atwater on the other. After
concluding that "Atwater's claim to live free of pointless
indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City
can raise against it specific to her case,"1 35 he added that "we
have traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth
Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring
sensitive case-by-case determinations of government need, lest
every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an
occasion for constitutional review." 36 Thus, the Court held that
as a per se rule, a police officer may arrest a driver for a
misdemeanor that he has probable cause to believe was
committed in his presence. Consequently, the arrest of Ms.
Atwater, though considered individually unreasonable, was held
to be constitutionally reasonable. 37
Essentially, the Court's argument boils down to the
unassailable argument that, all other things being equal, rules
are better than standards.1 38 The difficulty with the argument is
that it requires all other things to be equal. For example,
although the Court has adopted the Miranda rule for assessing

(Garza, J., dissenting).
133 Fortuitously, one of the neighborhood children was able to get the neighbor
who was able to take the children before Ms. Atwater was handcuffed and driven to
the police station. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 368-69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 369 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 347.
136

Id.

137 See id. at 354.
138 See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing constitutional rules and standards and
presenting arguments for each).
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the admissibility of confessions, 139 it has created an emergency
exception that is so amorphous that the police officer taking
advantage of the emergency need not even know or believe that
there is an emergency. 140 Similarly, the rule that a police officer
can use all necessary force to effectuate an arrest for a felony is
subject to an exception in derogation of the common law when
deadly force is employed to catch a burglar even though the
4
alternative is probably to allow the burglar to escape justice.' '
Consequently, the question to ask in every case is whether the
benefits from maintaining a clear rule exceed its costs.
The primary benefit the Court saw was the need to avoid "a
systematic disincentive to arrest in situations where even
Atwater concedes that arresting would serve an important
societal interest." 142 Undoubtedly this is a serious interest, but it
is no different from the interest compromised whenever a bright
line rule is fudged. For example, a police officer in a nonemergency situation may refrain from giving Miranda warnings
in the mistaken belief that there is an emergency. Thus, a
potentially valuable confession may be tainted forever because of
the Court's decision to jettison a bright line rule. Similarly, a
police officer unsure of the dangerousness of a suspect may
refrain from using deadly force, thereby allowing the suspect to
escape and perpetrate an unspeakable act of terror. Therefore,
something more than a necessary systematic disincentive should
be necessary to justify a result that legitimates a concededly
unreasonable arrest.
Recognizing this, the Court referred to "a dearth of horribles
demanding redress." 143 By this, the Court meant the absence of
evidence that Atwater-type nightmares are happening with any
degree of regularity. As the Court put it: "[S] urely the country is
not confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minoroffense arrests." 144 I have three problems with this line of

139 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
140 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1984) (commenting that the
availability of the exception does not depend on the subjective motivation of the
officer involved considering the spontaneity of the situation and the reasonable
concern for public safety).
141 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 21 (1985).
142 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351.
143 Id. at 353.
144 Id.
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reasoning: its relevance; its accuracy before this decision; and its
accuracy after this decision.
As to its relevance, one would have thought that the absence
of comparable abuses would be an argument buttressing
unreasonableness. If all over the country soccer moms were
regularly hauled off to jail every time they allowed a child to
temporarily unbuckle a seatbelt, eased through a stop sign, or
exceeded the speed limit by five miles per hour, Atwater's arrest
would have seemed par for the course, and perhaps not
unreasonable.
But precisely because these things do not
generally happen in this nation, the unreasonableness of the
arrest is apparent to most people who do not wear black robes
and get lost in abstractions.
As to the accuracy of the observation before the decision, the
data is inconclusive.
I suppose that arrests as extremely
unreasonable and counterproductive as Atwater's are relatively
rare. At least I certainly hope so. But arrests made for the
purpose of harassment or as a subterfuge to create a search
opportunity are not strangers to the Court. Indeed, it had just
such a case, Arkansas v. Sullivan,145 awaiting decision later that
term.
Atwater's attorneys did file a supplemental brief, detailing a
study of California and Oregon that indicated that slightly more
than one out of a thousand detected traffic offenses resulted in
arrest. 146 Although these figures were small on a relative scale,
they were not de minimis, averaging between 35,000 and 40,000
arrests per year in the two states. Unfortunately the study does
not tell us the circumstances of the arrests. Although the study
147 it
excluded vehicular manslaughter, DUI, and hit and run,
does not tell us how many of these cases involved circumstances
that should have led to an arrest, such as the driver with a
revoked driver's license. 148 Thus, we are left in the dark with no
real sense of the frequency of improper arrests.
Most importantly, however minuscule, the number of
outrageously improper arrests may have been before Atwater, it
145 532 U.S. 769 (2001); see discussion infra Part III.C.
146 Pet. for Reh'g at 3-4, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No.
99-1408).
147

Id.

148 See supra PartII.D for a discussion of United States v. Robinson 414 U.S.

218 (1973).
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is sure to rise in the wake of Atwater. Prior thereto, most police
officers in Officer Turek's position would not have assumed that
they were constitutionally free to impose gratuitous humiliation
on a citizen who had merely committed a minor traffic offense.
Now the police know that they. can. While one can hope that the
Court has not created an incipient "epidemic" of such searches, it
would be naive in the extreme to assume that they will not
significantly increase.
Before leaving Atwater, it would be remiss to overlook the
nature of this case. Gail Atwater is not a criminal. In a very
real sense, she is Ms. Everyperson. There is hardly a driver in
the country who has not at one time or another violated one of
the myriad of traffic offenses. 149 For years, we have been told
that the Fourth Amendment has been retarded by the
exclusionary rule. The argument goes that the Court, unwilling
to let criminals go, is likely to contract the scope of the Fourth
Amendment's
substantive provision. 150
Atwater raises
considerable doubts about that. A person who could have been
one of us is unnecessarily subject to abject humiliation. Even
though no criminal evidence is found, she is told not only that
she cannot have the wrong redressed, but also that the police
officer who perpetrated the indignity upon her was acting within
his constitutional power. So much for the exclusionary rule as
scapegoat for the Court's parsimonious view of the Fourth
Amendment.

149 At oral argument, Justice Scalia suggested, perhaps in jest, that he has
never committed such a misdemeanor himself. Oral Argument at 13, Atwater v.

City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408). So perhaps the text should
exclude him and those extremely few others who have achieved his level of
perfection. It should be noted, however, that one need not in fact commit a traffic
offense to be subjected to the Atwater indignity. It is only necessary for the police to
have probable cause that the "crime" has been committed.
150 See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism,
and the Civil Liberties, 45 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 252 (1950); see also Christopher
Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
63, 436-37 (1999). Slogobin states:
It might be added that, as an empirical matter, the rule probably does
more damage to public respect for the courts than virtually any other
single judicial mechanism, because it makes courts look oblivious to
violations of the criminal law and involves prosecutors, defense attorneys
and judges in charade trials in which they all know the defendant is guilty.
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C. Arkansas v. Sullivan
Arkansas v. Sullivan151 is a logical, though regrettable,

extension of Atwater 152 and Whren. 5 3 Joe Taylor, a Conway,
Arkansas police officer, made a routine stop to ticket Kenneth
Sullivan for driving forty mph in a thirty-five mph zone and for
having an excessively tinted windshield. 5 4
Upon seeing
Sullivan's license, the police officer realized that there was "
'intelligence on [him) regarding narcotics.' "155 Based on this
realization, the officer decided to arrest Sullivan for the traffic
offenses. Although the police officer added some other traffic
charges 15 6 and a bogus weapons charge, 5 7 all of the Arkansas
courts found that the arrest was effectuated as a pretext to
58
search Sullivan's car for drugs.
Officer Taylor stopped Sullivan in a service station and then
called for back up. The back up police officer took Sullivan to the
police station. Thereafter, while the car was still at the service
station, Officer Taylor conducted an "inventory" search of
Sullivan's car which turned up drugs. This "inventory search"
was in complete accord with Conway police regulations; 5 9
literally "by the book," if you will. Thus, if the pretextual arrest
was valid, so was the inventory search. 160
For the Supreme Court, this was an easy case, decided per
curiam. Obviously if a pillar of the community soccer mom can
532 U.S. 769 (2001).
See discussion supra Part III.B.
153Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see discussion supra Part II.F.
154 Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 769. Whether the excessively tinted windshield charge
is itself a Fourth Amendment violation is an interesting question. To the extent that
a state is concerned with excessive tinting blocking a driver's vision, there is no
Fourth Amendment problem. See, e.g., United States v. Fong, 662 F. Supp. 1319,
1322 (D. Del. 1987) (citing to statutes that govern window obstructions for safety
reasons). But to the extent that such statutes are concerned with restricting police
officers' ability to peer inside cars, the statute could arguably be thought to have an
anti-Fourth Amendment animus and be unconstitutional for that reason. The
resolution of this question is beyond the scope of this Article.
155 Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 770 (quoting State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552
(Ark. 2000), rev'd, 532 U.S. 769 (2001)).
156 The charges added were for not possessing his registration card, not
possessing proof of insurance, and operating an unsafe vehicle due to improper
window tinting. Id.
157 The "weapon" was a rusted roofing hatchet on the floor of his car. Id.
Sullivan was a professional roofer.
158 See id. at 771.
151
152

159Id. at 770.
160

See discussion supra Part II.B.
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be arrested for a traffic offense so can a suspected drug
possessor. A simple citation to Whren defeated the pretext
claim. 161 Therefore, Arkansas is free to use the narcotics finding
at Sullivan's trial insofar as the Federal Constitution is
concerned. 162
The four Justices that dissented in Atwater concurred in
Sullivan, feeling bound by precedent to do so.

163

Importantly,

Justice Ginsburg observed that "if experience demonstrates
'anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests,'
164
I hope the Court will reconsider its recent precedent."
As a result, we are left with a Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that seriously undervalues the security of citizens
traveling the highways.
IV. BUILDING A BETTER BALANCE
It is incumbent upon one who challenges the balance drawn
by the Supreme Court to develop a better one. In this part, I will
attempt to construct a better balance and chart the possible
ways to achieve it. The key to a proper balance is that it must be
just that: a balance. It cannot disregard legitimate police needs
any more than it can disregard legitimate citizen needs. The
balancer cannot forget that the text of the Fourth Amendment
does not forbid all search and seizures, only unreasonable ones.
As such, the Fourth Amendment is one of the few with a textual
65
commitment to balancing. 1
161 Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771-72 (quoting the unanimous holding of Whren that
"[slubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis").
162 Of course, Arkansas is still free to invalidate a pretextual arrest on state
constitutional or statutory grounds, which is precisely what it did do. See State v.
Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215 (Ark. 2002); discussion infra Part V.C.
163 Sullivan, 532 U.S.
at 772 (Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor, Breyer, JJ.,
concurring).
164 Id. at 773 (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001)).
165 Even Justice Black, perhaps the most absolutist rule-oriented Justice to
ever sit on the Court, understood that the Fourth Amendment requires balancing.
In his concurrence in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), Justice Black
differentiated the Fourth Amendment from other amendments:
Some constitutional provisions are stated in absolute and unqualified
language such, for illustration, as the First Amendment stating that no
law shall be passed prohibiting the free exercise of religion or abridging
the freedom of speech or press. Other constitutional provisions do require
courts to choose between competing policies, such as the Fourth
Amendment which, by its terms, necessitates a judicial decision as to what
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Automobiles and Warrants

The best balance for automobiles and warrants would be to
1 66 and Coolidge167 seriously. Carroll makes a
take both Carroll
powerful case, both historically and pragmatically, for allowing
moving vehicles, be it car or horse and buggy, to be searched
before it leaves the jurisdiction. While in theory a car could be
immobilized pending the issuing of a warrant, that seems
impractical at best, and probably inconsistent with the best
interest of most drivers. 168 Consequently, any reconstructed
balance should retain Carroll.
The Coolidge admonition that "[t]he word 'automobile' is not
a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades
away and disappears," 169 on the other hand, needs to be taken
seriously as a balancing bookend to Carroll. A properly
constructed balance should allow a warrantless search of an
automobile when, and only when, obtaining a warrant would be
impractical.
A serious application of the proposed Carroll/ Coolidge
principles would yield a different result in both Chambers170 and
Carney.171 In Chambers, the car was immobilized at the police
station. Presumably the magistrate was close by. Consequently,
there was no need under Carroll to search without a warrant
72
and the Coolidge admonition should have prevailed.1
is an 'unreasonable' search or seizure.
Id. at 176 (Black, J., concurring). But cf. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 557-60 (1999) (discussing the "warrant
preference" construction of the Fourth Amendment as compared to the "generalizedreasonableness" construction).
166 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see discussion supra Part II.A.
167 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); see discussion supra Part
II.A.
168 If the search reveals evidence of crime and the officer in fact lacked probable
cause, it will be excluded. If the search does not reveal evidence of crime and the
officer lacked probable cause, she will be subject to a civil suit. If the question of
probable cause is close, at least in theory, the searchee will be more likely to prevail
if the officer does not have a warrant. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926
(1984) (holding that a search with a warrant made in the good faith belief that it
was predicated on probable cause will be sustained). Therefore, the only potential
searchee who would be hurt by the rule is one who would rather be detained during
the warrant application process and avoid having his car searched as opposed to
suffering through the immediate search and seek redress afterwards.
169 403 U.S. at 461-62.
170 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); see discussion supra Part II.A.
171 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); see discussion supra Part II.A.
172 Of course, Coolidge was not decided until a year after Chambers.
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Similarly, in Carney, the police could have obtained a warrant
while the motor home was parked with its curtains drawn.
Obviously, if the motor home attempted to leave, a Carroll-type
contingency would have occurred and the warrant would be
unnecessary.
As long as the vehicle remained immobile,
however, a proper application of the Carroll/ Coolidge balance
would have invalidated the search.
B. Inventory Searches
The problem with inventory searches is their subterfuge,
vis-a-vis bona fide use. For example, in Sullivan,173 when Officer
Taylor determined that the man that he stopped for speeding
was a drug suspect for whom he lacked probable cause to search,
Taylor could hardly wait to arrest him and let another officer
take him to the police station while he personally conducted the
"inventory" search. Similarly, in Bertine174 and in Wells, 175 the
searches were clearly inventory in form and evidence-seeking in
substance. 7 6
If this type of inventory search could be
eliminated, much of the balance would be restored.
I would hold that inventory searches would be permissible
where they are pursuant to a police directive, and the directive is
reasonably related to the justification for inventory searches. By
conducting searches pursuant to a directive, as opposed to
"canalized discretion,"177 the officer is less likely to allow an
evidence-seeking animus to motivate his decision. Similarly, the
requirement that the inventory policy be reasonably related to
the justification for inventory searches can eliminate many of the
worst abuses. In Sullivan, for example, the vehicle had not even
been impounded. In Bertine, the arrestee could'have been asked
how he wanted his valuables and van protected. In neither case
was the procedure consistent with the need to protect valuables,
to protect the police from false claims, or to protect the police
from hidden danger. By insisting on these things, the Court
could "hold the balance true."

Nevertheless, its admonition was hardly unknown to the Court even if never
expressed in precisely those terms.
173 Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); see discussion supra Part III.C.
174 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); see discussion supra Part II.B.
175 Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); see discussion supra Part II.B.
17G See supra Part I.B.
177 Wells, 495 U.S. at 4; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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C. Roadblocks
Weigh stations for trucks are clearly necessary, other fixed
roadblocks such as permanent border checkpoints are probably
necessary. 178 Temporary roadblocks for such things as license
and drunk driving checks, however, differ from fixed roadblocks
in that they are unexpected and hence more frightening to the
average citizen. 179 They are also more inconvenient in that a
person, by hypothesis, does not know of their existence.
Consequently, he cannot build in the time delay. For example, I
know that the commuting time from my home to the law school
is eight minutes. If I am stopped at a roadblock to check for my
license, sobriety, or seatbelt usage, I may be delayed five
minutes. Thus I may be late for a meeting or class.
This might be a cost worth charging the citizenry if enough
concomitant gain to our safety could be achieved. Unfortunately,
this is probably not the case. The large number of police officers
that man a typical roadblock 8 0 are too busy frightening and
delaying innocent motorists to be out catching the dangerous
ones.
Consequently, temporary roadblocks, while not as
8
constitutionally problematic as singling out individual drivers,' '
are sufficiently harmful and unproductive to warrant their
invalidation.
An alternative that a state might consider would be to
require the showing of a driver's license to enter certain roads.
Such a requirement would be fixed, thus preventing
unanticipated delays. It would be like obtaining a ticket to
travel on a turnpike, a feature not uncommon in some states.
Indeed, it would be perfectly appropriate to have a breathalyzer
at such entrances.18 2 The point of eliminating roadblocks is not
178 Note, however, that Justice Thomas has recently suggested that perhaps

this question should be rethought. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
56 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); supra note 48.
179 The fear caused by these roadblocks is not unlike the feeling one must get in
a totalitarian country where the police might be expected to conduct surprise
roadblocks.
180 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
181See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); supra discussion Part II.C.
182 As Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent in Sitz:
Likewise, I would suppose that a State could condition access to its toll
roads upon not only paying the toll but also taking a uniformly
administered breathalyzer test. That requirement might well keep all
drunken drivers off the highways that serve the fastest and most
dangerous traffic. This procedure would not be subject to the constitutional
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to make it easier for unqualified drivers to remain on the
highway, but rather to make life less oppressive for the qualified
183
driver.
D. Search Incident to Arrest
The Court's Robinson decision was clearly correct. 8 4 In
addition to the bright line value of the rule, it is simply not
reasonable to expect a police officer to transport a suspect to the
police station without first conducting a thorough search.
Certainly, a small weapon, such as a razor blade, could be
hidden in even a crumpled cigarette pack, such as the one in
Robinson. Of course, part of the reason for allowing the search
incident to an arrest is that the arrest itself is such a serious
intrusion on personal liberty that the search can truly be called
merely "incident." Consequently, arrests, and searches incident
thereto, should occur sparingly. Gustafson, for example, may not
have warranted an arrest. 8 5 But, Robinson, which involved a
driver operating with a revoked license, clearly did warrant an
arrest and the consequent search incident thereto.
86
Belton, on the other hand, clearly needs to be rethought.
Most non-traffic arrests will furnish their own probable cause to
search. In Belton itself, the defendants were stopped, but not
arrested, for speeding. The smell and sight of marijuana in the
car, however, did furnish probable cause, and thus should have
justified the search. Contrariwise, an arrest for a traffic offense,
even if otherwise lawful, 8 7 should not justify a search of the
passenger compartment of the car. So, even if Atwater remains
good law, it is unlikely that the nightmare scenario posited at
the beginning of the Article would occur with any frequency if
objections that control this case.
Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 474 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183 See generally Loewy, supra note 63 (exploring the proposition that the
Fourth Amendment exists as a protection for the innocent that should only be
invoked by the guilty when it is necessary to protect the innocent).
184 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); discussion supra Part
II.D.
185 As Justice Stewart suggested in Gustafson: "It seems to me that a
persuasive claim might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest of the
petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973); see
supra note 68 and infra Part I.H.
186 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see supra discussion Part II.D.
187 See supra Part III.B; infra Part IV.G.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:535

the police were forbidden to search the vehicle incident to the
arrest. 188
E.

Consent

As long as judges or juries decide consent questions in
criminal cases, the fact finder will nearly always believe the
police, even though the police will not always be telling the
truth. 8 9 The only way to ensure that consent was in fact given is
to have the searchee sign a document prior to the search
indicating his consent. Because the consent should be voluntary,
the document should also include a statement that the searchee
was aware of his right to refuse.
This analysis assumes that it is not in society's interest to
obtain consent from individuals who do not wish to give it.
Although an occasional judge has intimated to the contrary, 190 I
believe that most jurists would concur. Nevertheless, the rules
that they have laid down practically ensure that some people
who do not wish to be searched will consent, oblivious to the fact
that they had a choice. The Court's most recent foray into the
area, United States v. Drayton,19 1 reaffirms Schneckloth192 and
Robinette,193 thereby continuing the police/citizen imbalance.
F.

Whren v. United States

Whren 94 involved two issues: the stop without authority and
the subterfuge stop. The easier of the two questions, which the
188 Of course, this also assumes that the Court adheres to my suggestions in
regard to inventory searches. See supra Part IV.B.
189 See supra Part 1I.E.
190 See, e.g., Martinez v. United States, 333 F.2d 405, 407 (9th Cir. 1964),
vacated, 380 U.S. 260 (1965). The court stated:
Happily, not all criminals are highly intelligent and use the most effective

tactics in their contacts with the police. Again happily, sometimes their
contacts with the police confuse them, and they say and do things which,
after deliberation, they regret. To whatever extent stupidity or confusion
on the part of the guilty person contributes to the prompt acquisition by
the police of evidence of crime, so that the police can get back to work on
the numerous cases which may remain unsolved, society is the gainer and
nobody is the loser of anything to which he is constitutionally entitled.

Id.
191 122 S. Ct. 2105 (2002).
192 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see discussion supra Part

II.E.
193 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); see discussion supra Part II.E.
194 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see discussion supra Part II.F.
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Court unfortunately answered wrongly, was the stop without
authority. If the local police regulations forbid a plainclothes
police officer to make a traffic stop unless certain specified
special circumstances are present, it is hard to construct an
argument that the stop, in the absence of such circumstances,
was reasonable. That is, however, precisely what the Whren
195
Court held.
Where a police officer has authority under local law to stop
for traffic offenses and, motivated by a suspicion of wrongdoing,
undertakes such a stop where the driver has, in fact, violated a
traffic law, the question is much closer. If the officer could do
nothing more than ticket or warn the driver and look at what is
in plain view in the car, as was the case in Whren, I would be
inclined to allow the stop. Unfortunately, the officer may also
196
ask for consent, without telling the driver she may refuse.
Furthermore, the officer can make an arrest for the traffic
offense 197 and search the car incident thereto' 98 or inventory the
car. 199 So long as this remains the law, subterfuge stops should
not be allowed. But, if those other abuses are corrected, a
uniformed police officer should be able to stop a traffic offender
and look into the car while giving a ticket or warning, whatever
200
the officer's subjective motive.
G. Traffic Arrests
Unquestionably there are times when a traffic arrest is
20 1
appropriate. Drunk driving or driving with a revoked license
are clear examples. Only an incompetent police officer would
allow a drunk or unlicensed driver to drive his vehicle home.
Even lesser offenses might have aggravating circumstances. For

195 See id. at 815, 818-19.
196 See supra Parts II.E, IV.E.
197

See supra Part III.B.

198 See supra Part II.D.

199 See supra Part III.C.
Were the rule otherwise, every speeder could potentially defend himself on
the ground that the police officer wanted to look into his car. While such defenses
would rarely be successful, I am loath to create such a potential argument unless it
is necessary to prevent real abuses. Whren was a real abuse because the policemen
were not traffic cops, but vice-squad officers. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
808 (1996).
201 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); see also discussion
supra Parts II.D, IV.D.
200
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example, in Atwater,20 2 suppose that Ms. Atwater, when stopped,
told Officer Turek: "I don't believe in seatbelts and no matter
how many times you stop me, I'm not putting them on." Under
those circumstances, Officer Turek would have been justified in
arresting Atwater.
To be sure, requiring something more than a traffic offense
simpliciter for an arrest makes the officer's job somewhat harder
and has the potential to create more litigation. But that is a
very small cost to pay for the security of the people, which is the
backbone of the Fourth Amendment. I do not mean to suggest
that every time a person hits the highway, the fear of arrest is a
front burner issue. I do, however, mean to suggest that my
hypothesized nightmare 2 3 and Gail Atwater's real nightmare
experience have no place in a country that purports to secure
20 4
people from unreasonable searches and seizures.
H.

Subterfuge Traffic Arrests

Were we to disallow Atwater-type arrests, there would be no
need for a special rule to prevent subterfuge arrests. But so long
as we permit such arrests, we must be careful that they are not
used as an excuse to search. A search incident to a real arrest is
one thing, but a search incident to an arrest that is made for the
sole purpose of searching is something totally different.
Sullivan20 5 is a good example. The facts could not be clearer.
The arrest was made solely to search. The Arkansas Supreme
Court recognized that both before 20 6 and after 20 7 the Supreme
Court's decision. The Supreme Court knew it too. It just did not
care.

202

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); see discussion supra Part

II1.B.
203 See supra Part

I.

The Fourth Amendment reads in pertinent part, "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
205 Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); see discussion supra Part III.C.
206 See State v. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d 526, 528 (Ark. 2000), rev'd, Arkansas v.
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001).
207 See State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Ark. 2002) (relying on
independent state grounds to find that pretextual arrest constituted unreasonable
police conduct and a basis for suppression); see supra note 63; discussion infra Part
204

V.C.
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To be sure, there will be difficult cases. Gustafson arguably
was a close case. 208 Gustafson claimed to be a student from a
nearby community, who had left his driver's license in the dorm.
The officer might have been able to check Gustafson's licensure
by phone, but given that the stop occurred in 1969209 and that
Gustafson claimed to have an out of state license, it is a factual
question as to whether such a check would have been possible.
Beyond that he had no way of knowing that the person before
him was actually James Gustafson. Thus, it might have been
reasonable for the officer to arrest him.
Unquestionably there is an element of discretion in a case
like Gustafson. The officer admitted to arresting only three or
four of every ten persons stopped for driving without a license.
He indicated that local residents were less likely to be arrested.
Given that Gustafson drove an out of state car, lived in a city a
few miles away, and appeared bleary-eyed, it is plausible that
the arrest should have been upheld. Unfortunately Gustafson
did not argue the point. Even more unfortunately, it would be
irrelevant if he argued it today.
V.

GETTING THERE FROM HERE

The distance between where we are and where we ought to
be is such that it would take an optimist of extraordinarily
Pollyannic proportions to believe that we can get all the way
from here to there anytime soon. Understanding that neither
Rome nor a sound Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be built
in a day, and candidly recognizing that reasonable people may
differ as to the precise parameters of a true balance, I will
examine how far we can reasonably hope to move and how we
can get there.
A.

The Supreme Court
For the long term, the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of
the Constitution, is the best hope to fix the imbalance that it
created. In the short term, much repair is unlikely. Certainly
there is no reason to believe that the Court will allow factual
immobility to negate a police officer's power to search without a
warrant except in the narrow confines of the Coolidge fact
See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); see discussion supra Part II.D.
209 This time was considerably less computer-sophisticated than the present.
208
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pattern. 210 And even Coolidge was technically a plurality
opinion, 211 which may make it vulnerable to eventual
overruling. 2 12 Similarly, the Court's willingness to blink at
subterfuge inventory searches 213 was reaffirmed when it upheld
214
the mockingly phony inventory search in Sullivan.
There is more reason for optimism in regard to roadblocks.
Not only did six Justices vote to invalidate Indianapolis's drug
checkpoint in the most recent case before the Court, 215but a
seventh Justice, Justice Thomas, who dissented in the case
based on precedent, indicated a willingness to reconsider and
possibly overrule such cases as Michigan v. Sitz. 216 Justice
Thomas is only one of four new Justices to join the Court since
Sitz. None of the other three, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, or
Breyer, has ever voted to uphold a roadblock. 217 Plausibly, these
2 18
four Justices could join Justice Stevens, who dissented in Sitz,
in overruling that decision. 2 19 Thus, there is at least some
reason to believe that the future of temporary license or sobriety
checkpoints may not be so secure as the right to conduct
warrantless and inventory searches of cars.
The future of Belton 220 searches is also uncertain. While
nobody has suggested rethinking the scope of a search incident
to an arrest in an automobile, the question does not frequently
arise. In most cases of an appropriate arrest in an automobile,
210 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
211 1 say technically because Justice Harlan,

443 (1971); supra Parts II.A, IV.A.
whose fifth vote was necessary for
a majority, did not appear to disagree in any significant way. See id. at 491; supra
note 17.
212 Cf. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (overruling the "plain
view" analysis of the Coolidge plurality).
213 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); see also discussion supra Parts
II.B, IV.B; cf. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
214 See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); discussion supra Parts III.C,
IV.B.
215 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); discussion supra
Parts II.C, IV.C.
216 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56; see supra Part II.C (discussing Mich. Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 460 (1990)).
217 All three Justices were in the majority in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32 (2000). See discussion supra Parts II.C, IV.C.
218 496 U.S. at 460; see also supranote 182.
219 I do not mean to suggest anything more than a possibility of the Court
reaching such a result. Justice O'Connor, who wrote the opinion in Edmond, took
pains to distinguish Sitz. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43.
220 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see discussion supra Parts II.D,
IV.D.
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the circumstances of the arrest will give rise to probable cause to
search, thereby obviating the need to search incident to the
arrest. 221 Where the justification for the arrest does not give rise
to probable cause, the police seem more predisposed to rely on an
inventory search than on a search incident to an arrest.2 22 An
alternative solution available in cases of apparent danger is to
"frisk" the car, i.e. briefly search the interior of the car for
weapons. 223 Thus, I believe that the future of Belton remains
224
uncertain.
While the future of roadblocks and Belton searches may be
uncertain, there is nothing uncertain about consent searches. As
recently as June 17, 2002, in United States v. Drayton,225 the
Court emphasized the continuing vitality of Schneckloth and
Robinette. The Court upheld the "consent" search of bus
passengers who were approached by police officers who
announced their mission to interdict drugs, and refrained from
informing the passengers of either their right to leave or their
right to say "no." 226 After the consensual search of their bags,

which proved negative, the police "asked" to frisk the passengers,
a procedure that the Court has described as a serious
indignity. 227 Although the passengers possessed drugs in a hard

22
packet under their clothing, they "consented" to the frisk. 8
One positive from Drayton is that Justice Souter, who joined
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in dissent, suggested that a
warning should be necessary before consent under those
circumstances is valid. 229 Given that Justice Souter wrote
Atwater, it is significant that he recognized the need to "hold the

221 Belton itself is a good example. See 453 U.S. at 455-56 (noting that the
police officer smelled burned marijuana and saw on the floor an envelope suspected

of containing the drug).
222 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367 (1987); discussion supra Parts II.B, IV.B.
223 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034-35 (1983) (noting that even
though the frisk of the automobile is theoretically for weapons, any drugs found
thereby are also admissible).
224 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Florida v. Thomas, 531 U.S. 1069
(2001), to consider the current scope of Belton, but ultimately dismissed the case as
unripe for adjudication, expressing no opinion on the merits. See 532 U.S. 774
(2001).
225 122 S. Ct. 2105 (2002).
226 Id. at 2113-14.
227 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1968).
228 Drayton, 122 S. Ct. at 2113.
229 See id. at 2115.
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balance true" in Drayton.
In view of Justice Souter's
demonstrated ability to learn from past mistakes, 230 his concern
for the plight of the passengers in Drayton may suggest a more
balanced approach to a future Atwater, should one arise.
Despite Schneckloth, Robinette, and Drayton, there is some
reason to believe that consent given pursuant to a threat to
arrest will be held invalid. Schneckloth emphasized that no
threat to arrest had been made. 23 1 Thus, if one consents
pursuant to an arrest threat, 23 2 the consent plausibly would not
be valid. Of course, such a holding would not necessarily benefit
drivers because the police could just arrest the driver after
consent was denied, search the car, and release the driver after
nothing was found. So, regardless of the ultimate resolution of
the validity of a consent search obtained under threat of arrest,
the balance will continue to be heavily weighted against the
citizen.
The Court is obviously not concerned with subterfuge. Not
only was Whren 233 a unanimous decision, but also the entire
Court in Sullivan234 condoned the subterfuge aspects of the
case. 235 There is, however, some hope that the Court will rethink
Atwater.2 36 Atwater is partly predicated on the assumption that
230 For example, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991),
Justice Souter would have upheld restrictions on nude dancing because of its
deleterious secondary effects. Nine years later, in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529
U.S. 277, 316 (2000), Justice Souter partially dissented based "on a demand for an
evidentiary basis that I failed to make when I concurred in Barnes." Souter rejected
his earlier decision, lamenting that "I should have demanded the evidence then,
too." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). He explained this change of heart as a result of his
earlier ignorance, "but after many subsequent occasions to think further about the
needs of the First Amendment, I have come to believe that a government must toe
the mark more carefully then I first insisted." Id. at 317 (Souter, J., dissenting).
231Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, based his conclusions on the finding
that" 'the prosecution met the necessary burden of showing consent . . . since there
were clearly circumstances from which the trial court could ascertain that consent
had been freely given without coercion or submission to authority ... '
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221 (1973) (quoting People v.
Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)).
232 A variant possibility of the nightmare scenario imagined at the start of this
Article. See supra Part I.
233Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see supra Part II.F.
234 Sullivan v. Arkansas, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam); see supra Part III.C.
235 The four Justices that concurred believed that an arrest should not be
allowed at all. But given that the Court had held otherwise in Atwater, they upheld
the search, unconcerned with the subterfuge character of either the arrest or the
subsequent search. See Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 773.
236 See discussion supra Part III.B.
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behavior such as that exhibited by Officer Turek is sufficiently
rare that we need not constitutionally worry about it. To the
extent that this assumption either was always false or becomes
false as officers avail themselves of the open season on
automobiles declared by the Court, perhaps the Court will
rethink its decision.
Unfortunately, though it seems inevitable that the number
of traffic arrests will rise, perhaps overwhelmingly, they are
likely to stay beneath the Court's radar screen. It is highly
unlikely that another Atwater will come to the Court. What
lawyer would bring such a case? She would have a better chance
of being hit with Rule 11 sanctions 237 than she would of winning.
Even in the criminal context, Sullivan seems to be an absolute
bar to even noticing these concerns. Perhaps if enough traffic
arrests get to the Court on such issues as search incident to
arrest,238 inventory search, or consent, the Court, particularly
Justice Souter, 239 will take notice and grant certiorari in a
traffic case to reconsider Atwater. Candidly, however, I am not
holding my breath.
B.

State Legislation

Ordinarily, the state legislature is not a reliable source for
reigning in police excesses. The average citizen, who, of course,
employs the legislators, does not tend to see the Fourth
Amendment as a balance between the police and himself.
Rather, he sees it as a conflict between the police and
criminals. 240 As such, he roots for the cops. Consequently, a
237 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes on all lawyers who
sign or file motions, pleadings or other paper, the obligation to engage in "an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances" or face sanctions. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). This
rule is designed to prevent unreasonable, frivolous, or harassing legal action by
unscrupulous lawyers. Id. at 11(b)(1)-(2).
238 For example, while Belton made it clear that some automobile searches
incident to arrest are permissible, a host of questions including whether a locked
glove compartment or the trunk of a hatchback accessible from the passenger
compartment may be searched were left ambiguous and remain unresolved. See
supra Part I.D.
239 Justice Souter was probably the Justice in the majority most concerned
about the infrequency of such arrests. He noted the question asked at oral argument
that inquired as to "how bad the problem is out there." Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001). I frankly doubt that Justice Scalia would be terribly
concerned with the frequency of such arrests.
240 See Slobogin, supra note 150, at 416 (predicting that the public will support
"highly questionable" police tactics).
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legislator desirous of holding her seat is not likely to support
measures that the citizen would see as "handcuffing the police."
Because of this distorted view of the Fourth Amendment, 24 1 the
legislature is generally not helpful in ameliorating the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment imbalance.
Remedying the Atwater situation legislatively is another
matter. Many, perhaps most, citizens have had traffic contacts
with the police that they would just as soon forget. When the
issue is police power in that context, a legislator can expect to
gain, not lose, votes by seeking to reign in the Bart Tureks 24 2 of
the world. Even the hardest nosed law and order zealot is not
likely to support such wanton arbitrariness. Thus, unlike almost
every other Supreme Court decision upholding police
arbitrariness, Atwater is amenable to legislative correction.
Whether such legislation would in fact limit police may
depend on whether the legislation includes an exclusionary rule.
If it does not, it is plausible that the Supreme Court would still
allow evidence obtained from an unlawful, but not
constitutionally unreasonable, arrest to be admitted.
To
illustrate, in Whren, 243 the Court upheld the admission of
evidence obtained from a seizure forbidden by District of
Columbia Police regulations.
Similarly, in California v.
Greenwood,244 the Court allowed evidence to be introduced that
was obtained in violation of the California Constitution. 245
Because California did not have an exclusionary rule for state
constitutional violations, and because the evidence was not
obtained in violation of the Federal Constitution-which, of
course, does have an exclusionary rule-the evidence was
admissible under the Federal Constitution. Thus, to ensure that
police will not be tempted to harass hundreds of innocent
citizens in the hope of catching one guilty one, it would be best
241 A more accurate view would recognize that the Fourth Amendment measure
should focus on the innocent citizen. I have developed this at length elsewhere. See

generally Arnold H. Loewy, Protecting Citizens from Cops and Crooks: An
Assessment of the Supreme Court's Interpretationof the FourthAmendment During

the 1982 Term, 62 N.C.'L. REV. 329 (1984); Loewy, supra note 63.
242 Bart Turek was the police officer in Atwater. See Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); discussion supra Part II.B.
243 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see discussion supra Parts II.F,
W.F.
244 486 U.S. 35 (1988); see also discussion supra Part I.H.
245 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 42-43. Under the California Constitution, searching
a person's trash is forbidden. See People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971).
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for the legislature to include an exclusionary rule. 246
C.

State ConstitutionalLaw

State constitutional law can fix much of the broken balance.
While lacking nationwide impact, a state supreme court can
ensure that, at least in its jurisdiction, an appropriate police
citizen balance is maintained. Sometimes the fix comes in the
247
very case that created the problem. For example, in Sullivan,
the Arkansas Supreme Court, after being told that it could not
expand the Federal Constitution, construed its own constitution
to forbid subterfuge arrests. 248 In addition to Sullivan, examples
of states refusing to accept the Supreme Court's conception of
balance abound. 249 Thus, a state does not have to accept an
unreasonable search as reasonable.
D. (Substantial)B + (Substantial)C (Could) = A
At the risk of appearing overly algebraic, this heading
simply suggests that if enough legislation and enough state
constitutional decisions are rendered condemning Atwater, the
Supreme Court might rethink its position.
The Fourth
Amendment, whose most important phrase is "unreasonable"
surely is sensitive to, if not driven by, evolving standards of
decency. For example, after refusing to adopt the exclusionary
rule in 1949,250 the Court reversed its course in 1961251 largely
because a significant number of additional states had adopted
the exclusionary rule between 1949 and 1961.252
246 I do not mean to suggest that it would be impossible for the Court to find
that an arrest effectuated in contravention of state law is constitutionally
unreasonable. Indeed, it seemed to suggest as much in Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347. I
only suggest that such a conclusion is far from irresistible and that a prudent
legislature wishing to stop Atwater type police behavior totally ought to include an
exclusionary rule.
247 Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); see discussion supra Part II.C.
248 74 S.W.3d 215 (Ark. 2002).
249 See, e.g., Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993)
(reevaluating Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)); Ohio v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d
762 (Ohio 1997) (reevaluating Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)); South Dakota
v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (reevaluating South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)).
250 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
251 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
252 In Mapp, Justice Clark, for the majority, stressed that "[w]hile in 1949, prior
to the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of the States were opposed to the use of the
exclusionary rule, now, despite the Wolf case, more then half of those since passing
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The center of the Court continues to be influenced by
"evolving standards of decency." For example, as recently as
June 20, 2002, the Court overturned a prior decision and held
that mentally deficient people could not be executed. 253 The core
of its rationale was that standards of decency had changed in the
intervening years between the two decisions. This rationale was
predicated almost entirely on changes in state law between the
two cases. 254 While not all of the Court was persuaded by, or
even amenable to this rationale, 255 Justices Souter and Kennedy,
both part of the Atwater majority, were persuaded.
For now, state rejections on a massive scale, followed by the
Supreme Court's recognizing the demands of "evolving standards
of decency," seem to be the best method to rectify the Atwater
imbalance: Such an ending would be a magnificent tribute to the
grace and dignity exhibited by Gail Atwater throughout her
ordeal. It would also remove a serious blot from the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. Too bad it cannot remove the nightmares
25 6
that Atwater's young son has about the police.
CONCLUSION

For several years, the Supreme Court has strayed from a
balanced Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in regard to
automobiles. Despite occasional nods in support of citizens'
rights, the Court's overwhelming predilection has been to
support police claims of greater and greater authority. This
predilection culminated in the 2001 Atwater and Sullivan cases,
upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision, have wholly or partly adopted
or adhered to the Weeks rule." Id. at 651.
253 See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002) (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
254 See id. at 2252.
255 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas all strongly
dissented. The Chief Justice acerbically suggested that "the Court's assessment of
the current legislative judgment regarding the execution of defendants like
petitioner more resembles a post hoc rationalization for the majority's subjectively
preferred result rather than any objective effort to ascertain the content of an
evolving standard of decency." Id. at 2252. Justice Scalia was equally dubious of the
Court's ability to "miraculously" extract a national consensus and distill it into good
constitutional law. Id. at 2261.
256 Indeed, her children were so traumatized that they are both "terrified at the
sight of any police car." Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 370 (2001)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Respondent's Brief at 393-95). Her three-year old
son "had to see a child psychologist regularly" and continues to have recurring
nightmares about the incident. Id. (citing Respondent's Brief at 396).
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giving the police power to arrest anybody reasonably believed to
be committing a traffic offense and the concomitant right to
search their cars.
Because the Supreme Court is unlikely to remedy this wrong
on its own, it is incumbent upon state legislatures and courts to
forthrightly reject it. When that happens in sufficient numbers,
there is a good probability that the Supreme Court will rethink
its position, overrule Atwater and Sullivan, and thereby move in
the direction of restoring a proper police/citizen balance.
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